Dear Partners, ████ and Friends,
There are challenges with liquidity in venture. This is related to the “pig in the snake” phenomenon I’ve discussed in previous letters. During the irrational ’20-’21 VC funding bubble, the market (the “snake”) swallowed thousands of startups (the “pig”). Sticking with this slightly unpleasant metaphor, the snake now has bad indigestion: the capital is still locked up in these startups, causing major liquidity issues for LPs.
VC markets recently reached the highest-ever ratio of capital called to capital distributed.
M&A of startups, which is central to returning capital to LPs, is in the doldrums. In the few M&A deals that are happening, often the acquired startups have little runway left (time before they run out of money), so they’re likely being acquired at lower prices, which means less capital coming back to LPs.


Sluggish M&A is not the core issue, though. It’s IPOs that drive a disproportionate amount of the DPI (Distributed to Paid-In Capital) in venture, but IPOs are at a near standstill. Returns via IPOs in 2023 were 96% lower than in 2021 ($657 billion in 2021 vs. $23 billion in 2023).
In fact, there were fewer tech IPOs in the last three years than in the wake of the global financial crisis. This is surprising, especially when the public markets are performing well. Great startups with strong growth rates should be able to go public in this environment, even if their valuation multiples are down from the 2021 peak. There are likely many reasons, but I worry that one is that a lot of the reported value in these funds is actually locked up in a bad vintage of late-stage companies that cannot go public and never will.

Earlier this quarter, SVB put out a shocking statistic: 27% of US tech unicorns are unprofitable and have declining year-over-year sales.
I assume these companies are unicorns in name only; a sub-scale company losing money and declining is not at all likely to trade at a valuation over $1 billion. This is starting to be reflected in metrics from private markets: On Forge Global’s secondary market, 89% of “unicorn” transactions were done at a valuation lower than their prior funding round.
Ultimately, I don’t know what will happen to these withering unicorns. Many will probably dissolve and be acquired for parts like Tally (raised $172 million, dissolved and acquired by LendingClub and Pagaya in 2024) Convoy (raised $900 million, collapsed and had its tech stack bought by Flexport in 2023), and Olive (raised $852 million, filed for bankruptcy and acquired by Waystar and Humata in 2023).

You may feel more optimistic than I do when looking at the future of these prior vintages. I guess it depends on how you’d answer a few questions. Do you believe unprofitable and shrinking startups will, as a group, make a turnaround? If not, do you think VCs have marked down the positions of their portfolio’s late-stage, unprofitable, shrinking startups? Even in a disappointing exit, could they still get their money back? I have no idea.
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Seed investing started to take off right after the 2007-08 financial crisis. Seed deals hit a high-water mark in 2021 and have dropped off since, but they remain 60% of all deals done in venture.
Today, there are 3.1x Seed deals per Series A, the highest ever. This statistic underscores why we aren’t, generally, seed investors.
This overhang of seed deals is leading to a “Series A crunch.” This crunch could get worse, and soon, because startups are running out of money. According to SVB, in Q2’22, 37% of startups had 24 months of runway or more. Two years later, only 22% of startups do. During the same period, the median cash runway for US tech startups dropped from 13 months to 7.

Again, Viewpoint is later-stage, so Seed issues aren’t a major concern for us. That said, such issues will continue to drag on venture sentiment for a while, which does affect us.
Picking the right comparable model and the strategic importance of scale in Viewpoint’s Portfolio
One of the few early-stage companies in our portfolio is Goodwin. When its founders talk to other VCs, they often get asked, “Is this a roll-up?” or “What is the SaaS (Software-as-a-Service) fee you charge brokers?” These are understandable questions, but the wrong ones.
Goodwin is very similar to our portfolio companies PLACE, Spark, and Farther, but Goodwin is in the private jet broker space instead of real estate, health insurance, or wealth management, respectively. None of these are roll-ups, nor are they SaaS businesses. In fact, we believe they are far more like a tech-enabled marketplace (or an aggregator if you are a Ben Thompson devotee).
These four companies provide holistic technology and services to producers, the humans who acquire and retain clients through hustle and their idiosyncratic, non-scaled lead sources. Top-performing producers, who want to focus on revenue-generating activities, are early adopters of these new platforms because they handle most non-value-added tasks. Internally, we call these companies “Tech-Enabled Producer Platforms” (TPP). While relatively new, TPPs are not unheard of. Goosehead, a tech-enabled personal lines P&C brokerage (currently valued at $4.07 billion and trading at a 150x P/E ratio), is an excellent example of a TPP.
Investors have distinct ideas about how to evaluate and value roll-ups, SaaS, and marketplaces, but none of those models quite capture the potential in TPPs. TPPs do share characteristics of three models:
• Like roll-ups, TPPs try to aggregate producers onto a single platform. However, TPPs mostly grow organically, not through M&A. They focus on creating best-in-class tech and services to attract producers.
• Like SaaS, building software products is a core competency for TPPs and early cash flows can look similar. Revenue builds similarly in that each additional producer adds to the expected future annual recurring revenue.
• Like tech-enabled marketplaces, TPPs often connect a market’s demand side (producers) to the supply side. They also tap into similarly powerful network effects and other accumulating advantages to scale that lead to winner-take-all dynamics.
But there are vast differences in the role that scale plays in the equation.
For roll-ups, scale provides operational efficiencies from centralized back-office functions, better and cheaper capital access, and a valuation premium tied to their diversification and market importance. This value of scale explains why a roll-up can acquire a target firm at, say, 6-15x EBITDA, but the rollup gets valued more like 15-25x EBITDA. There is a cap, however, to how much value can be wrung out of scaling up through acquisitions, at least in producer-led industries. In wealth management, there are many rollups of similar size; the larger players don’t run away with the market. If significant value were created solely by scale, large rollups would prioritize acquisitions of other large roll-ups, not smaller targets. Instead, in wealth management and insurance, there are many dozen scaled rollups, all scouring the market for tuck-in acquisitions.
Scale is more strategically important for SaaS businesses. They have predictable, recurring revenue with high gross margins. This means, in theory, as more customers that come aboard, a higher percentage of revenue turns into profit. Consider the widely known “rule of 40” used to compare SaaS companies. It holds that the sum of a company's growth rate and profit margin should exceed 40%. For example, a startup with a 20% EBITDA margin that is growing 20% (20+20=40) should be as valuable as a startup with a -20% EBITDA margin that is growing 60% (60-20=40). Roll-ups, by contrast, typically don’t want to buy firms that aren’t already profitable.
For tech-enabled marketplaces, scale is a strategic imperative. Their product or service only becomes more valuable if more people use it — the network effect phenomenon. (Uber became more valuable to riders when a lot of drivers joined the platform. And Uber became more valuable to drivers the more users were on the platform.) Technology makes this dynamic even more potent because the marginal cost of adding and servicing another user drops continuously. This dynamic can lead to accelerated adoption and market dominance. Uber lost more than $31 billion before it turned a profit — but the only thing that mattered was scaling up faster than competitors to achieve dominance. There are other taxi services and ride-hailing apps (Lyft), but Uber captured an incredible amount of the market, IPO’d, and now has a market cap of over $160 billion.
TPPs often look like rollups or SaaS—they might even start out that way. However, as they scale, TPPs become more like a tech-enabled marketplace. They gain leverage over the supply and, ultimately, the demand side. Both sides of the market need to use the TPP to access the other side.
This helps explain why Viewpoint portfolio TPPs often compete with large incumbent SaaS businesses or private equity-backed roll-ups. But they never compete with an existing tech-enabled marketplace. If there is an existing, scaled, tech-enabled marketplace, there is no opportunity left for a TPP. Due to the power of the network effects and accumulating advantages of scale of the marketplace model, the market is already won.
Let’s get back to what this means to Goodwin. In the $30 billion private aviation charter market, brokers control 50% of the demand. Supply is controlled by operators, groups that can manage up to hundreds of aircrafts. Goodwin is building a holistic platform of tech and services that attracts brokers because it lets them spend so much more time building their business.
If Goodwin were a roll-up, investors would assess its ability to cheaply acquire profitable brokers, whether enough brokers exist to build a large business, and what EBITDA multiple you thought Goodwin would trade at once they had rolled up several brokers. Using this method, Goodwin is not worth much.
If Goodwin were a SaaS provider, investors would assess its “take rate” (the percentage of broker commissions it could keep) and determine if operators might also be charged some kind of fee. Using this method, Goodwin is worth something, but the market is far too small to expect that it would command top-tier Seed-stage valuations.
As a tech-enabled marketplace, however, Goodwin looks very different. Once Goodwin has captured a critical mass of demand by attracting private jet brokers, the supply side (charter aircraft operators) will be forced to digitally connect to Goodwin. This will create the first digital, instant marketplace for chartered flights with a path to “win” and greatly expand the market. Using this model, investors would assess the value of creating such a market and determine if Goodwin is positioned to win.
We have realized that all TPPs are indistinguishable from tech-enabled marketplaces once sufficiently scaled. At scale, TPPs have aggregated demand via attracting the producers, and they aggregated suppliers because the TPP controls access to the demand. For TPPs, the same accumulating advantages to scale that drive rapid growth, ever-increasing moats, and winner-take-most dynamics in tech-enabled marketplaces apply for them. The key to the “alpha” Viewpoint has identified is that TPPs do not start out looking like marketplaces, making it hard for VCs not focused on TPPs to recognize the opportunity.
Insurance has many sub-industries, each of which is producer-led. This is why we dedicate so many resources to it, including going all-out with events and programs at Insurtech Connect (ITC), the year’s most important insurtech conference.
We opened the Oct.15-17 conference with our third annual Viewpoint Strategy, Corporate Development, and Innovation Summit, which drew over 250 industry leaders. This was followed by two executive roundtable dinners for P&C executives and another for leaders in Life, Retirement, and Benefits. We also delivered more than 70 tailored reports to insurance carrier executives containing handpicked recommendations of startups that align with their priorities. While half our team met with industry executives to discuss strategy and innovation trends and needs, our investment team was busy meeting with about 80 startups over three intense days. Finally, I took the main stage to share a 10-minute excerpt from the 45-minute AI presentation we delivered to insurance executives across the United States.
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I look forward to seeing and catching up with many of you in coming weeks and as always, thank you for your partnership and support.
Fondly,

Drew Aldrich, Managing Partner
